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Japanese companies value service and quality highly and they put much effort in realising this. 
However, survey research carried out in 2001 among senior managers of Japanese logistics 
companies in the Netherlands, indicated that these efforts do not result in significant performance 
differences compared to western companies. In this exploratory paper, we report of company 
visits and interviews with managers of Japanese logistics companies in Western Europe. They 
described a clash of cultures underlying their operations, prohibiting them from achieving 
performance excellence. The causes focus around two key factors: the unique concept of Japanese 
service, based on future rewards which are absent in Western Europe; different employment 
circumstances in Western Europe, which make Japanese human resource management ineffective, 
and the Japanese career development system which makes that Japanese managers do not always 
have the right focus in their job abroad. We conclude that Japanese subsidiaries in Western Europe 
should keep on nourishing their unequalled service standards, while simultaneously adapting to 




1. Introduction.  
 
Since the late 70s, Western companies have adopted total quality management (TQM) and JIT 
procurement and production methods from their Japanese counterparts. Japanese lean 
manufacturing techniques, particularly in the automotive industry, astonished Western 
manufacturers by realising shorter throughput times, inventory levels, shorter cycle times, but 
also by the much higher quality of the products (Schonberger, 1982). One of the most remarkable 
Japanese “implants” is the NUMMI plant described in many textbooks (f.e. Slack et al, 2001), 
which became GM’s best performing US plant within a few years after installing a Japanese 
management team. Since then, their world-class manufacturing practices quickly became the new 
quality standard for the U.S. and European automotive industry (Liker and Wu, 2000). The great 
emphasis and achievements of Japanese firms in the areas of service and quality often strike 
Western Europeans as remarkable. Timely delivery in Japan means 100% of deliveries precisely 
on time. High quality means zero defects. Many authors attribute the successes of Japanese 
operations to the much larger management focus on operations and quality practices compared to 
Western companies (Adler and Cole, 1993; Van Breukelen et al. 1998; Lin et al, 2004). 
On the other hand, however, the emphasis on quality may sacrifice productivity. Japanese quality 
and service orientation need time and human resources and are not always cost-efficient (Fahy 
and Taguchi, 1995). In a recent survey research among European distribution centres, De Koster 
and Warffemius (2005) showed that, although great effort was taken to meet the Japanese 
productivity and quality standards, performance differences (measured by error-free deliveries 
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and worker productivity) from the Western counterparts were not significant.  
 
Our research questions are, therefore, what challenges Japanese logistics management faces in 
Europe, whether the emphasis on quality and service pays off sufficiently and, if this is not the 
case, what suggestions can be made to improve the situation. As a survey is not likely to reveal the 
real causes for underlying factors, we opted to go for an exploratory multiple-case study on 
Japanese-owned logistics firms. According to Meredith (1998), the case method is particularly fit 
to answer the questions of why, what and how, with a relatively full understanding of the nature 
and complexity of the complete phenomenon. Furthermore, it lends itself to early, exploratory 
investigations where the variables are still unknown and the phenomenon not at all understood. 
As the questions contained issues sensitive to the firms investigated, we decided to go for 
semi-structured interviews (partly in Japanese) in an open atmosphere with ample opportunity for 
the interviewees to speak up. We selected and visited 23 Japanese-owned logistics companies (for 
an overview, see the Appendix) from different sectors, with different supply-chain positions 
(manufacturers, distributors, and service providers). 
In the next section we first describe differences in human resource management practices between 
Japanese and Western firms. In section 3 we report on the problems Japanese logistics firms in 
Western Europe face, and give a number of examples illustrating the difficulties in achieving 
Japanese quality and service levels. In section 4 we look for the main underlying causes of these 





2. Are Japanese companies different? 
 
Several authors claim that quality management practices have direct impact on organisational 
performance. Madu et al. (1995) found a causal relation between a quality construct (i.e. customer 
satisfaction, employee satisfaction, employee service quality) and organisational performance. 
Forza en Filippini (1998) found that TQM (total quality management) improved quality 
conformance and customer satisfaction. Samson and Terziovslei (1999) found a significant 
relation between TQM practice and organisational performance. Although not all authors include 
the same dimensions to measure the quality management practice construct, dimensions typically 
include: training, product/service design, supplier quality management, (attention for) process 
management and improvement, quality data and reporting, and benchmarking. 
Emphasis on quality management practices is however not sufficient for company success. The 
results of an empirical study by Powell (1995) showed that “most features generally associated 
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with Total Quality Management – such as quality training, process improvement and 
benchmarking – do not generally produce advantage, but that certain tacit, behavioural, 
imperfectly imitable features - such as open culture, employee empowerment, and executive 
commitment – can produce advantage”.  In other words, employee relationship practices may also 
play a role. On top of this, many authors include customer (service) orientation as one of the 
dimensions of quality management practices (Powell, 1995, Lin et al., 2004).  
 
The above literature therefore suggests a causal model as sketched in Figure 1. We included 
customer orientation as a construct separate from quality management practices. 
 
 
Figure 1. Quality management and employee relationship practices and customer orientation 
drive organisational performance. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Japanese companies are known for their quality management 
practices and customer service orientation. Several authors also found that Japanese companies 
have more attention for employee relationship practices than Western companies, which have 
their roots in cultural differences. Ouchi and Jaeger (1978) make a distinction between typical 
American companies and typical Japanese companies, which they denote by type-A and type-J 
organisations. According to these authors, Japanese companies in the USA have adapted to 
circumstances and, ideally, exhibit a type-Z organisation, which is a hybrid adaptation of type J 
and type A. Their organisational types are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Type A (American) Type J (Japanese) Type Z (modified American) 
Short-term employment Lifetime employment Long-term employment 
Individual decision-making Consensual decision-making Consensual decision-making 
Individual responsibility Collective responsibility Individual responsibility 
Rapid evaluation and Slow evaluation and promotion Slow evaluation and promotion
+ 
+ 










Explicit, formalised control Implicit, informal control Implicit, informal control with 
explicit, formalised measures 
Specialised career path Non-specialised career path Moderately specialised career 
path 
Segmented concern Holistic concern Holistic concern, including 
family 
Figure 2. Differences between Japanese-owned and American companies in the USA (Ouchi and 
Jaeger, 1978) 
 
The dimensions quality performance and productivity of the dependent construct Organisational 
performance are not fully independent. If much effort is put in Quality management practices, this 
may lead to better Quality performance, but possibly at the cost of a reduced efficiency. Indeed, 
Yeung et al. (2004) state that not all dimensions of the three independent constructs contribute 
equally to the Organisational performance dimensions. Process improvement (part of quality 
management practices) primarily affects cost-related performance (productivity), while 
customer-oriented practices lead directly to customer satisfaction (closely related to quality of the 
service). Organisational performance therefore, is a matter of striking the right balance between 
inputs and outputs. Hence, it is not obvious that Japanese companies, albeit the effort put in 
quality management practices, employee relationships, and customer orientation strike a better 
overall balance. In a study of 136 companies in Taiwan, Lin et al. (2004) investigated differences 
in quality management practices, employee relationship, and customers’ relations and found that 
Japanese-owned firms exhibit significantly higher efficiency performance (measured by the ratio 
of productivity, competitiveness, and financial outputs over various inputs related to the 
independent constructs of Figure 1) than American or Taiwanese-owned firms. This implies that 
Japanese firms would be better able to strike this balance than the American- or Taiwanese-owned 
firms. Simultaneously, however, Lin et al. (2004) remark that “there is a large input excess in 
employees’ relations for Japanese-owned firms” for their sample of companies in Taiwan, 
implying that emphasis on employee relations do not sufficiently pay off in efficiency 
performance. This is in line with findings of De Koster and Warffemius (2005), who carried out a 
survey among 65 logistics managers of European distribution centres (EDC), of which 12 
American and 14 Japanese that were not outsourced. Focus of the survey was on finding potential 
performance differences (in productivity, quality, and flexibility) between American and Japanese 
distribution centres and between 3PL operations and own-account facilities. From this survey, 
differences showed up in the way Japanese and Western managers organise their operations. 
Japanese facilities have significantly (p=0.04) more middle- and top-managers from the home 
country than American operations, where local management dominates (see Figure 3). Also, 
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Japanese firms tend to employ more quality management methods, with particularly significant 
differences for the use of quality circles and kaizen (continuous improvement practices). However, 
no significant difference in the quality realised (measured by the percentage of order errors) and 
no significant difference in productivity with American-owned firms could be measured. On the 
contrary, the European-owned firms appeared to be close to more flexible (p=0.08) than Japanese 
or American-owned firms. Although these results were somewhat unexpected, it matched with 






























3. Interview results  
 
The main objectives of the interviews were to establish validity of the lack of performance 
excellence and causes for this. In view of the sensitivity of the subject the interviews were held in 
an open atmosphere, with ample opportunity for the managers to speak up. People and company 
names have been changed in this paper and we chose to present findings in a rather descriptive 
manner. Interviews focused on customer service, quality management, process management and 
human resource management practices. Interviews were held with both Japanese (often the 
director or CEO) and European logistics staff (for example the warehouse manager) in separate 
meetings. While talking with these managers, many of them expressed their frustration with the 
way their organisation was run. From the interviews five main problem areas emerged for 




• A frustrating decision-making process 
• Japanese managers have difficulty to maintain a Japanese way of management 
• Differences of objectives between the firm and the individual Japanese managers 
• Customer service and quality orientation, without clear pay-off 
• Balancing between arms-length relationship and networking  
 
In the sequel we describe these problems and illustrate them with some examples revealed to us.  
 
a. A frustrating decision-making process 
A majority of the interviewed non-Japanese staff working for Japanese companies in Europe 
complained about the slow decision-making by the management. If European management makes 
a proposal, at first they do not receive any response from their Japanese boss. This is attributable 
to the Japanese business culture to carry out a thorough investigation of the matter and its 
background. This is always required before drawing up a proposal, which is normally done by the 
junior staff. Managers of multiple levels at the head office in Japan are required to examine and 
make necessary corrections to the proposal. The role of the management of the European 
subsidiary in the decision-making may be, therefore, only to present a proposal to the head office. 
However, once a formal decision has been made actions are taken quickly and collectively. At that 
stage, no objection or hesitation is allowed any more, since all the people involved in the project, 
from the bottom to the top, have already been offered a chance to express their opinions and 
change the direction of the decision. Proposals for building warehouses and office buildings at 
MOL and Yamaha took a similar cumbersome process for analysis and decision- making, but the 
implementation was expeditious after the decision had been made.  
In the Western business culture, discussions are important to come to a decision. Therefore, in 
Europe, a decision is supposed to take place after the discussions, whereas in the Japanese 
environment, oral communication is not regarded as an important method of exchanging opinions 
(Nakane, 1967). Only by written documents, the matter can be examined precisely. The Japanese 
linguistic characteristics to use vague expressions in conversations seem to have led to this 
business tradition (Oe, 1995). This decision-making process is widely known as “Ringi System”, 
or proposal circulation system. Example 1 illustrates this decision making process. 
 
Example 1. Bottom-up decision-making 
The CEO of a Japanese firm’s European logistics service subsidiary has to decide on employment, 
remunerations, promotions, organisations, finance, warehouse space, and truck leasing, which 
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would fall under the discretion of the local management at non-Japanese firms. For such decisions 
the CEO must write a proposal to the division head at the head quarter in Japan supervising the 
European subsidiary. The next step is unique. The proposal is normally not discussed between the 
European CEO and the division head in Japan, but is first examined by the junior staff of both 
organisations. After they have completed examination, the manager at the head quarter reads both 
the proposal and the examination report, and makes amendments again. Then, it will be examined 
by the deputy general manager and, then, by the general manager of the division for a decision. 
An important decision sequentially goes further up to higher-ranked persons or the board meeting. 
In the examination process from the junior level and up to the top step-by-step upwards, those 
managers frequently ask questions to the European CEO and his subordinates. This process is 
important to make the proposal a perfect document covering all the necessary supporting data, 
reasoning, competition, effect on the market, and estimated profit for the next several years, and 
makes it sometimes look almost “risk-free”.  
 
A process as described in Example 1 is customary for large Japanese firms. In this way, 
decision-making is documented, and the people fully support the project and cooperate in the 
implementation. However, according to the European staff we interviewed, the Japanese director 
in Europe tends to follow a similar decision-making process for minor matters as well. If a 
non-Japanese manager of the European subsidiary is involved somewhere in such a process, he 
will often be frustrated to see the bureaucracy and the tardy process, which may sometimes yield 
negative responses without clear explanations by the Japanese manager. Japanese firms delegate 
less power to the head of an overseas subsidiary than American or European companies would do. 
 
b. Japanese managers have difficulty to maintain Japanese way of management 
‘Genba’, or shop floor, attention of Japanese management is considered as one of the most 
important elements of competence.  
Mr. Maeda, former managing director of Washin BV, the subsidiary of a Japanese company, says, 
“When I arrived in the Netherlands as newly appointed managing director of the company, I woke 
up early in the morning one day and went to my company at 6 am to shake hands with all the sixty 
truck drivers and see them off departing for the day’s business. This was done in order to show my 
commitment to them and co-working spirit.” Mr. Teranishi, general manager at the Rotterdam 
branch of Japan Logistics BV, keeps his second desk in the large room together with his 
operational staff to oversee daily practices and track what is going on in his business sphere 
everyday. He rarely uses his private room. Listening to the business conversations of the staff is 
deemed important to perform his duty as the top manager. This is similar to the situation in Japan, 
where the general manager and section managers share an office with all their staff. 
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We found that, at many Japanese logistics companies in Europe, high-ranked Japanese managers 
tend to be concerned about daily operations. Reports on important operational matters must reach 
the top management without fail or delay. Accidents and damages to the goods are matters of 
utmost concern to them. In case of an incident with a Japanese client’s goods during storage or 
transport, the senior manager of the Japanese logistics service provider would immediately pay a 
visit to this client for apology. This can create a rather awkward feeling among non-Japanese staff 
of the Japanese firm. While Japanese managers are committed to operational excellence and are 
extremely nervous about mistakes, the non-Japanese staffs accept that humans can make mistakes. 
What disconcerts non-Japanese staff is that Japanese managers often take severe disciplinary 
measures on the person who has made a mistake or damaged the goods. 
Japanese managers try to train non-Japanese staff how to react to an angry Japanese customer in 
case of trouble. It is not allowed to argue with the customer even if the customer caused the 
problem. “Apologise first, and speak reason later” is an established method to keep long-term 
relationships with clients. Japanese service providers are pressed by their (Japanese) customers to 
yield a Japanese service style. Trying to adapt the local personnel to this business culture often 
leads to discord between the Japanese and the European staff. 
 
c. Personal aims versus business objectives 
Many of the Japanese we met declared their will to continue to work for the same company until 
retirement; the overseas assignment is a temporary status in the chain of a long career within the 
same company. Apparently, Japanese managers rate a position in the core business at the head 
quarter higher than a position at a local office, even if it is one rank higher. They can take the 
overseas assignment as an opportunity for broadening the experience, a chance to show 
entrepreneurial ability, an anxious period of future uncertainty away from the important senior 
bosses in Japan, or a nice time to enjoy European culture and tourism. If they regard the European 
position interim, the local business will lose growth potential.  
In many Japanese companies, the appointment of a manager to an overseas subsidiary is not 
determined by the competency of the person to manage the company in a multicultural setting, but 
as a result of a large-scale regular staff reshuffling. According to the survey by The Japan Institute 
of Labour (1999), only 57% of the Japanese managers seconded to Europe desired this prior to the 
secondment, 14% of them were reluctant to go to Europe, and 34% did not have any specific 
aspiration about the place of work. The wish of the spouse is usually not at all taken into 
consideration. According to the survey results, Japanese managers abroad worry about the 
education of their children (42%), housing and saving for the future (37%), and feel to be left 
behind in the company politics while being away from the head office (23%). 
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Accordingly, many Japanese managers working at European subsidiaries have difficulty to 
innovate the European business. Losing an important Japanese customer in Europe badly affects 
the evaluation at the head office. Therefore, keeping Japanese customers supersedes an ambition 
to acquire a new European customer. See also Example 2. 
 
Example 2. Logistics service providers: European or Japanese customers? 
Mainichi Logistics Ltd., a Japanese logistics service provider, took over a well-known Dutch 
competitor to extend its European business. Part of the senior Dutch management was replaced 
with a Japanese one. However, a large part of employees were still Dutch due to the parent’s 
policy of management localisation. The goal was to integrate the Dutch firm into the global 
strategy of the Japanese parent by merging Japanese quality standards with Dutch rationality. 
When the Japanese managers were assigned to the Dutch firm, they were bewildered with the 
directness of the Dutch staff and the lack of their dedication to customer service. On the other 
hand, the Dutch staff claimed that the European customers showed bewilderment in the different 
manners and ways of communication of the Japanese managers. Japanese managers often only 
pay courtesy calls at the European customers and make few commitments until they have 
obtained an approval of the head office in Japan. The Dutch managers were asked to adapt 
themselves to the Japanese way of service for the Japanese customers and maintain their 
European style for the European customers. After some years, the Dutch managers realised that 




d. Service orientation, without clear pay-off 
Japanese dedication to customer service is sometimes overwhelming. Many customers are treated 
indulgently by their suppliers and logistics service providers. Therefore, almost all the Japanese 
logistics service providers interviewed complained about the overly demanding and unreasonable 
attitude of their Japanese customers. They need a special relationship management, which has 
been cultivated in the long history of business interactions. Therefore, Japanese managers are 
reluctant to leave those matters to the European managers. (See Example 3.) 
 
Example 3. Import of European wine in Japan 
A large Japanese wine importer buys French and German wines and ships them in full container 
loads to Japan. Stock is kept in a European warehouse, operated by a Japanese logistics service 
provider. When the wine cartons arrive in this warehouse, warehouse workers apply  a small label 
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to each bottle, showing the Japanese description of the product, country of origin, importer’s 
name etc., as required by the Food Hygiene Act of Japan. The importer also requests the 
warehouse to make a sample check of the bottles: labelling, transparency of the content, and the 
cleanliness of corks. Bottles are excluded from the shipment if the label is not evenly adhered, 
sediment is found, or the cork is found moulded, because the Japanese distributors will instantly 
reject those goods. Unfortunately for the importer, those defective bottles cannot be returned to 
the European suppliers for a refund, because they are not deemed defective in the sales contract as 
the content is still in a normal condition according to the European standard. Those defective 
goods are destroyed in the European warehouse at the importer’s cost. Moreover, upon arrival at a 
warehouse in Japan, the bottles are rechecked by the contracted logistics service provider. There, 
every bottle is inspected thoroughly, which mostly results in the detection of more defective 
bottles. As the importer has already paid the ocean freight and the import duty, the financial 
damage is larger in this case. 
In spite of this higher cost, the importer holds on to this double inspection system as he is obliged 
to supply wine in a perfect condition to the Japanese retailers.   
 
We found multiple similar examples of apparently excessive quality and service focus of Japanese 
firms, without clear payoffs. Japanese warehouses we visited typically illustrate a focus on 
poka-yoke (or foolproofness) and zero-defects by double or even triple manual checking, 
regardless of the cost to achieve this. For the Japanese management, the maintenance of quality 
and service supersedes by far the profitability of the business. In Japan, service is basically 
regarded free of charge. Therefore, it has traditionally been difficult to charge fees to customers 
for flexible delivery, information provision, consultation or value adding services. Quick delivery 
of goods is taken for granted. Frequent and just-in-time delivery is a must, whether it is necessary 
or not. Since good logistical services are regarded so essential and natural, customers are not even 
aware that it costs money to maintain this standard. Moreover, with the rise of electronic data 
interchange, logistics service providers are required to increasingly invest in computer systems to 
provide those services. However, fierce competition in logistics business usually does not allow 
the firm to recover the investment cost by increasing the rates. Japanese customers mostly do not 
pay for the service directly but implicitly compensate for it by continuing to give business to the 
service provider on the basis of longer relationships. We elaborate this in the next paragraph.  
 
e. Outsourcing or networking? 
In Japan, trust is the basis of business transactions (Sako, 1992). Long-term relationships 
gradually lead to a tight link between the core manufacturing firm, suppliers, and logistic service 
providers (Helper and Sako, 1995; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). Even if there is no capital relationship 
between any of the companies, often some directors are assigned from the large manufacturer to 
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the small ones. On the other hand, junior staff members of suppliers and logistics service 
providers are seconded to the core manufacturer to take up some of the operational or research & 
development functions there, according to their specialty (Nishiguchi and Brookfield, 1997). This 
is a symbol of a close tie and regarded as a facility to assure future business for the small firms. 
Such a group of firms becomes a Keiretsu (or affiliated firms) or a Kyoryoku-kai (or cooperative 
circle) (Hines 1996). See Figure 4. The difference between Keiretsu Logistics and Third Party 
Logistics is, as such, not clear in Japan. People work together as if they belong to the same firm. A 
third-party logistics service provider within the Keiretsu can be regarded as a member of the 
family but with a separate wallet. However, once the trust has been lost between the firms, the 
Keiretsu relationship may be dissolved at any time by the declaration of the core firm..  
This system contrasts with the Western business environment, where people tend to move from 
one employer to another more often than in Japan. Companies tend to keep independence whether 
they are large or small, and the relationship between two firms is regulated by contracts. On the 
other hand, people in the Western region tend to maintain personal relationships with the people 
co-related with each other in business for long, irrespective of who their employers are. 
For large enterprises, Keiretsu formation has worked very effectively to ensure quality of 
products and services to customers. However, Japanese firms have recently begun to realise that 
the cost incurred for that service assurance is hardly justified from the short-term perspective. A 
solution for that tends to be more outsourcing without long-term commitment (Lamming, 2000). 
Keeping exclusive suppliers, distributors, warehouse operators, truckers, and forwarders is 
becoming more and more burdensome for the core firm because the life and death of those 
dependent firms totally rests on the prosperity of the core company. Nissan’s recent drastic 
measures to cut those relationships for survival are exemplary (Gosn, 2001). 
As a result, Japanese companies in Europe primarily outsource logistic operations (HIDC, 2001) 
and they must settle for a lower level of customer service. It is a challenge for the logistics 
managers of manufacturers to keep balance between service and cost on the basis of an 
arms-length relationship with the logistics service providers.  
 






























4. Causes of differences and difficulties 
 
The outcomes of the interviews indeed indicate a lack in achieving performance excellence of 
Japanese logistics firms in Europe. The differences of concepts and practices between European 
and Japanese logistics illustrated in the previous section provide a general view of the difficulties 
that Japanese logistics face in Europe. The five problems mentioned can be related to differences 
in value system as expressed in Figure 2. Two key factors can be identified as follows.  
 
The unique concept of service in the Japanese system 
Good service is attached to any type of contract and taken for granted, as free of charge. Customer 
satisfaction is given the first priority, thus costly service provision is continued in anticipation of 
the reward of long-term partnership between the two firms. As such, the cost for the seemingly 
free service will be recovered in the long run.  
Japanese customers in Europe are demanding the same level of logistics service as being provided 
in Japan. However, in Europe commitment of the Japanese customer to the service provider has 
been transformed to European standards (Taylor, 2001, found similar results in Japanese plants in 
China), and tends to be short-lived. For a service provider, the unique correlation between service 
concept and long-term mutual commitment is understandable only by Japanese managers. 
European managers and their staffs cannot accept cost bearing without a foreseeable opportunity 
for compensation. Therefore, Japanese managers are always busy visiting the existing Japanese 
customers in order to keep good relationship rather than trying to cultivate new non-Japanese 
customer bases. 
 
Distinctive characteristics of Japanese employee-relationship management 
The firms we interviewed display some features of the type-Z companies of Jaeger and Ouchi 
(1978); i.e. they have adapted themselves to Western European circumstances. However, many 
traditional Japanese human-resource practices are maintained for the seconded Japanese staff, 
such as long-term employment, generic career paths, collective responsibility, and intimate 
relationships between people. These elements work efficiently in networks of collaboration and 
knowledge creation. This system has created tacit knowledge to improve the quality of work, 
which is shared by all the Japanese co-workers (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  
However, in the different human resource management circumstances in Europe, several of the 
Japanese elements for excellence are not available. In logistics practices, rapid turnover of 
workers, especially of young and ambitious persons, makes it very difficult to give them a 
structured on-the-job training and to enhance a co-working spirit. Contracts and transparency 
supersede trust. Good ideas for quality improvement do not emerge from the shop floor, but 
top-down decision-making is the prime way to manage logistics. In contrast with manufacturing, 
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in which superiority in technology plays an important role in Japanese successes (LeBlanc, 2000), 
logistics mainly depends on the responsiveness of human resources. 
For a Japanese manager, the assignment to a job in Europe is a small part of his long career within 
the same company. His evaluator is in Japan. The colleagues with whom he used to work together 
in Japan are his valuable assets and may help him in the career path from time to time and even 
after retirement. In this way, there is an implicit and unconscious differentiation between overseas 
jobs and domestic ones. The expatriate-based management system can be characterised by an 
insider-outsider mentality that prevents real internationalisation of Japanese overseas operations 
(Legewie, 2002). European colleagues are not seen as valuable human assets like the Japanese 
colleagues because of the short-term relationship. The job in Europe is regarded as temporary, 
thus trouble-shooting becomes a main job, rather than strategic planning. 
 
 
5. How can Japanese overcome the problems in Europe?  
 
The recent extension of Japanese firms’ supply chains to Europe has created many new problems 
pertaining to logistics. Obviously, the human resources available in Europe are not compatible to 
the Japanese business culture if no structured measures are taken to rectify the problems. 
The Japanese have historically been learning from the Europeans in technologies and social 
management since the middle ages. When they started logistics operations in Europe, a common 
key word was to localise their management: “When in Rome, do what the Romans do.” Instead of 
introducing the typical Japanese management method with long-term employment, seniority 
order in promotions, on-the-job training, and beyond-contract services, short-term employment, 
result-oriented pay and promotion, individual job responsibility with little training in-house, and 
adherence to contracts were applied to the European staff of the same firm. However, top 
management still consists of Japanese and most of the customers of Japanese logistics service 
providers are still Japanese, whose requirements are no different from those given in Japan. 
Therefore, even if the general management tries to follow the European way, daily 
decision-makings and operational practices remain the same as they were in Japan. 
If Japanese logistics management desires to achieve success in Europe, the above-mentioned 
long-established specificity of business practices should be abandoned. We suggest the following. 
 
First, the top manager of a Japanese firm in Europe needs to be a good communicator, whether 
European or Japanese. He, or she, should understand both European and Japanese management 
styles well and be able to merge them to manage logistics in the way suitable to the supply chain 
specific to the firm. He, or she, will need to be able to openly exchange opinions with both 
European and Japanese colleagues. 
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Second, staff at the head quarter at the parent company should understand the social situation and 
environment peculiar to the region where the subsidiary is located. Especially, the 
decision-making process that is inherent to Japanese management should be transformed into a 
generally accepted one.  
Third, the head quarter of logistics service providing companies should not force the subsidiary to 
be adhered to the relationship with Japanese customers overseas. The growth of business abroad 
will depend on how many new business partnerships can be created with the firms locally 
operating. The top manager of the European subsidiary should be encouraged to develop a 
customer base out of the Japanese society. In that process, an arms-length relationship with both 
European and Japanese customers should be promoted. 
Fourth, even in pursuing the Westernisation of management, those Japanese firms should still find 
their competitive edge in the traditional management method. The strength of Japanese business 
has been long-term thinking, excellent on-the-job training, team spirit, and knowledge transfers 
from the senior to the junior (Koike, 1997). Why not introduce those elements to the management 
in Europe? In order to do so, Japanese logisticians need to make in-depth analyses of factors that 
construct those practices and develop methods applicable to the European environment. 
Ultimately, given the rapid globalisation of markets, there is a possibility that cultural differences 
in the supply chain will even bring added sophistication to the logistics management method in 
the future. 
 
In this exploratory paper we gave evidence of problems in the Japanese logistical service 
provision in Europe, and suggested possible remedies. In follow-up researches the validity of the 
problems and root-causes should be assessed. We suggest a multiple-case study approach. In such 
research, non-Japanese companies should also be included (for example as matched pairs) in 
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23 Companies involved in the site visits and interviews 
Yamaha 
MOL Logistics 
Sony Logistics Europe 
Tsubakimoto Europe 
Mitsubishi Motor Netherlands 
Toyota Motor France 
Toyota spare parts Europe 
Hitachi data systems 
Fuji Photo Film Europe 
IRIS Ohyama 
Kintetsu World Express 
Marantz Europe 
Meidi-Ya Rotterdam 
Mitsubishi Logistics Europe 
Mitsubishi Nederland 
Nichirei 
Nippon Express Rotterdam 
Nissin Transport Germany 
NPK Europe 
Ricoh Logistics  
Sato Corporation 
Seino Logix  
Yamato Transport Netherlands 
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